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DAMAGES; BREACH ov CONTRACT; MENTAL SUPPERING.

McBride v. Teleplione Co., 96 Fed. 81 (1899). The complaint
in this action for damages stated that while the complainant
was away from home his daughter fell ill and the family were
in need of a remittance of money. His son, acting as his
agent, thereupon sent him a telephone message, stating the
facts, and asking him to return as soon as possible. The message was never transmitted, and in consequence, the complaint
further alleged, the plaintiff remained ignorant of his child's
illness until after her death. Because of his apparent neglect
his wife and children became estranged, his home was broken
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up and he suffered great mental anguish and distress. There
was a demurrer to the complaint, which, by agreement, was
argued and submitted for the purpose of testing the question of
the proper measure of damages.
The rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 354
(854), the leading case on this subject, for the measure of
damages in actions on contract is as follows: "The damages
which one party to a contract ought to recover for breach of it
by the other are such as either arise naturally from the breach
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of the parties, when making the contract, as
the probable result of the breach. Any other claims for damages are regarded as too remote. And the same rule applies,
mutatis inulandis, to actions sounding in tort." Anson, in his
valuable work on contracts, *309, fully agrees with this view.
Hanford, the District judge in the case under discussion,
although he cites no authorities in his opinion, seems to follow
Hadley v. Baxendale when he says: "The failure to transmit
the message is not the direct or the proximate cause of the disruption of the plaintiff's family." Nor was it the direct or the
proximate cause of the daughter's death, as in Telegraph Co.
v. Stephens, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 429, 21 S. W. 148 (1893), where
a physician was summoned by telegraph and his arrival delayed
until.the child died. It was shown at the trial, or at least intimated strongly, that had the physician received the message,
and so arrived in time, the child would have been saved. In
that case damages were even allowed "for the superadded pain
and anguish caused to the parents by seeing their child die
without relief."
Judge Hanford then went on to say that even if the plaintiff's
trouble was the difec and proximate result of the defendant's
negligence, yet .tlhe plaintiff could not recover, for such could
not be the natur'al'result of a breach of the contract within the
cohtemplation of the parties. He thus again impliedly followed
Hadley v. Baxendale.
The rule seems to be well settled that damages for "nervous
or mental shock" are too remote. See Webb's Pollock on
Torts, page 54, and the cases there cited. In a few of the States,
notably North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Indiana, the
courts have essayed to compensate in money the grief or regret
of the addresse "of-atelegraphic message negligently delivered
too late to .permit to attend on the bedside of the ill or the obsequies'of the dead, although he has suffered no pecuniary loss
or bodily injury. See Young v. Tel. Co. 107 N. C. 370 (189o),
'I S. 1. 1044; Wadsworth v. W. U. Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695
(1888); Chapman v. W. U. Tel. Co., 13 S. W. 88o (189o), and
Reese v. W. U. Tel. Co., 123'Ind. 294 (1889). So Relle v. Tel.
Co., 55 Tex. 308 (I88I), is the first and leading case on this
side; it has been followed; with slight modifications, in all the
later Texas cases. The contrary is certainly the sounder doctrine. In Chapman v. W. U. Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. W.
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901 (1892), and Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 So. 823

(i89I), the authorities on both sides of the question are
reviewed and the right of recovery denied. Judge Thompson
has an able article on this subject in 33 Cent. Law Jour. 5
(1891). The notes to Rwy. Co. v. Cau'field, ii C. C. A. 571
(1894); Tel. Co. v. Coggin, 15 C. C. A. 250 (1895), and Tel. Co.
v. Morris, 28 C. C. A. 62 (897), contain much that is of value
on this important subject.
We have no doubt of the correctness of Judge Hanford's
decision. The rules that apply to telegraph companies would
certainly apply to telephone companies, but we would have
enjoyed the learned judge's opinion more had he cited a few, at
least, of the many valuable authorities on this point.
To some this case may seem hard, but "hard cases make
bad law." In this connection we can do no better than refer
to Judge Hanford's words: "If he (the plaintiff) is a kind
and dutiful father and husband, the refusal on the part of his
wife and children to accept a reasonable explanation of his
apparent neglect proves conclusively such perversity and
unlovely dispositions in them that the distress and humiliation
and loss which the plaintiff alleges he has suffered must be
attributed to their unreasonable behavior, rather than to the
defendant's breach of his contract."

INJUNCTION; ]ENFORCEMENT or AN AGREumRNT NOT TO
RNGAGE IN BusINEss.-The case of Cook et al. v. Brisebois,
Rapports Judidares de Quebec, vol. xvi, page 46 (decided in
May last), sheds new light uponithe powers of a court of equity
to enforce a negative covenant. Cook el al. filed a bill in equity
to have the defendant, Brisebois, enjoined from continuing in
the business of tallow-rendering in the city of Montreal. Brisebois sold his tallow-rendering establishment in Montreal to the
complainants. In the agreement of sale there was the following condition: "It is also understood and agreed that Mr.
Brisebois will do all he can to turn over his trade to Hughs,
Cook & Co., and engages himself not to enter the business
again at any time or help any one toward doing so." Soon
after, the defendant was actively engaged in the formation of
another company; he solicited orders and was well known in
his connection with it. But he never held any interest in the
company, being employed by it at a weekly salary. The court
granted the inj unction, restraining the defendant from carrying
on or being engaged in the business within the district of
Montreal.
Looking at the terms of the contract, it appears to be an
agreement in restraint of trade unlimited as to space or time.
Such a contract is void, under the most extreme cases. No
case has gone further than Nordenfeldl v. Maxim, L. R. Ap. Cas.
535 (1894), and in that csse the time was limited to twenty-five
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years. But in those cases, there has been a reason which does
not extend to the present. In all of them, the court has decided
that the restraint thus sought to be imposed was necessary and
reasonable for the protection of the purchaser in the enjoyment
of the article purchased. Underwood v. Barker, L. R., i Ch.
D. 301 (1899); Robinson v. Heuer, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 456 (1898).
Of course, if the court has the right to limit the application
of the agreement to the district of Montreal, their restraint
does not violate this rule of English law. But we have been
able to find no English case which allows the court to limit the
scope of the contract, as to space land time, according to any
presumed intent of the parties. It is true that the English
and American courts have held that a contract which is severable-if a part of it be a reasonable restraint-can be enforced
to that extent. If this contract had been not to carry on the
business in the district of Montreal or elsewhere, the decree
granting the injunction, would have been unexceptionable:
Underwood v. Barker, (supra); Trenton Potteries Co., v. Oliphant (N. J.) 39 Atl. Rep. 923 (1898). In the first case, just
mentioned, Lord Justice Lindley said: "An agreement in
restraint of trade, which is wider than is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the person seeking to enforce it, is invalid
so far as it is wider than is so necessary, and this may invalidate the whole restraint sought to be imposed, if the clause
imposing it is so framed as not to be severable." It would be
impossible for the court to justify its decree upon the ground
that this contract is divisible, nor does it attempt to do so.
The strongest argument in favor of the decree is to be
found in the case of Avery v. Langford, Kay 663 (1854). The
court, in the case under discussion, says thatthey are warranted,
upon the authority of Avery v. Langford, in limiting the
injunction according to the nature of the business. But in that
&se the restraint as to space and time was admitted to be
reasonable, and the only thing the court did allow the character of the business to affect was the meaning of the ambiguous
expression "not to set up a trading establishment." It was
the same kind of a question that came before the court in Perlk
v. Saafeld, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 149 (1892), when the court endorsed the doctrine laid. down in Avery v. Langford.
Oppo ed to the decree in Cook et al v. Brisebois is the
authority of Waid v. Byrnes, (5M. and W. 547, 1839), which
was taken notice of and distinguished in Underwoodv. Barker.
There an agreement by the defendant not to engage in the coal
business for nine months after the termination of his service
with the complainants was held void as imposing a restraint
beyond what was reasonable-being unlimited as to space.
This" case and the present one are flatly upon the same ground.
There is an American case, decided in the Circuit Court of the
United States, which more 'e ily supports the case in issue
than any English authority: Hitchcock v. Anthony, 83 Fed.
R. 779 (1897). There an agreement not to sell fish or "do any-
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thing that will conflict with said coal or fish business of the
said Anthony," was held valid, and limited in its application
to the area .covered by the plaintiff's business. There are,
however, marked points of distinction between the two cases.
In the light of this last case, the decision of the Circuit
Court in a case like the present might be in favor of an injunction. As for the :English courts-while they have been steadily
breaking away from many points of the common law doctrine
-in the light of the words of Lord Justice Lindley, and the
unreversed case of Ward v. Byrnes, we think they would have
refused to grant the injunction in this case.

DOWER: ErPzI-T OF RlJ -MAkRIAGP ON WIDOW'S RIGHT.The case of Brown's appeal, 44 AtI. Rep. 22,. (S99), is an
interesting r~sum6 of the effect of divorce on a widow's right
of dower. The appellant claimed dower in her deceased husband's estate under the following facts: Lucius D. Brown had
been divorced from the appellant (she being the innocent party)
and both subsequently married. The second wife of the
decedent was still living and also the second husband of the
appellant. When the decree of divorce was granted the appellant had not received any provision by way of jointure, had
entered into no agreement with the decedent in respect of her
property rights, received no alimony, nor had she in any way
forfeited her right of dower if such right exists under such
circumstances. The property in which the appellant claimed
dower was acquired subsequent to the decedent's second marriage. Judge Hamersley, in delivering the opinion of the
court, reviews the law of marriage, divorce, land, descent and
distribution as it existed in Connecticut from the settlement of
the State down to the present time; but the decision, however,
rests upon a recent statute which provides that "where a wife
is absent from a husband with his consent, or through his mere
default,

. . . in case of divorce, where she is the innocent

party, if no provision has been made for her, after the death of
the husband, she shall be entitled to have dower in his lands."
"But," the court said, "It is certain that a woman divorced
is admitted to dower only because she represents, and no other
is, the wife living with her husband, or separated through his
fault. In this case the much-married man has left a widow,
and, under the statute she, and no other, is entitled to dower."
This case is unique and raises some nice questions for discussion. The general rule in this country is that where there
is a divorce a vinculo mairimonii the dower right of the
divorced woman is barred absolutely whether she be innocent
or not, or whether the husband has re-married or not. When
the divorce is a mensa el thoro the majority of courts hold that
the right to dower is not barred.
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In the case under discussion the court cited the case of
Stilson v. Sfilsm, 46 Conn. 15, (1878), where it was held that a

divorced wife has dower right in her husband's estate provided
he has not re-married, since she is then his widow although
living apart from him through his fault. Her right of dower,
the court said, "is precisely the same as that of a woman living with her husband at the time of his death."
There seems to be no question but that a wife's dower right
is barred when she is in fault and a divorce "a vinculo" is
granted. Also her right may be barred by her adultery and
elopement but under some statutes elopement is necessary in
order to bar her right. In Cogswell v. Tibbeits, 3 N. H. 41
4is'
).it -was said: " It is very clear under this statute there
cotildbie no for, eiture wi thout -whatis denominated an elopement.
And to constitute an epopemeintj .tD-4 wife must not only leave
the h.ssband, but go beyond his ctual control. For if she
abandon the husband.tf: gqes and lives in adultery, in a
house belonging to him; it E.'id not to be an elopement."
In

Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842), the court said,

"That the widow is barred of any claim, by reason of her having left her husband before his death, cannot be sustained.
The evidence tends to show that the separation was, in the end,
by the mutual consent of husband and wife. Be this as it may,
there is nothing in the evidence that can bar the widow's right
of dower, or her right to a distributory share. Though the
wife might have been indiscreet, and have left the husband
without a justifiable cause, still this would not work a forfeiture
of her rights."
There seems to be a conflict in the decisions with regard to
whether the husband re-marry or not. Some courts hold that
a wife, though divorced, is still the wife for the purpose of
receiving dower as long as he has taken no other wife to fill
her place. This, we think, is a distinction which ought not
to be made. If the husband is in fault, the court should at the
time of the granting of the decree of divorce make him provide
for his injured wife and not allow her to wait until after his
decease to put in a claim for dower, when it will, necessarily,
be. much more difficult to ascertain who was really in fault.
Such ad 3ctrine, if adopted, would render the interpretation of
statutes on the -subject of dower uniform and put an end to
useless suits. With regard to any property which the husband
may-acquire after the divorce, she can have no claim to and
could not, reasonably, expect to get dower. When the divorce
was grhnted it was at her request, she then received alimony
in lieu of dower, and should rest content with a reasonable
settlement out o'f the then estate of her husband. In Millimore
v. Millimore, 4o Pa. 151 (1861), it was held that where a
divorce "a vinczlo" had been granted at the request of the
wife, although the granting was irregular, she was, nevertheless, estopped from claiming dower by setting up the irregularity.
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Where the decree of divorce is merely "a mensa et thoro"
the wife's right to dower is not barred even though the divorce
was granted at her request. In Amer. Legion of Honor v.
Smith, 45 N. J. Eq. 466 (1889), the court said, "The decree
of divorce a mensa et thoro did not dissolve their marriage bond.
Though separated by the decree from his bed and board,
Hannah still remained the wife of Henry Smith, and retained
all the property rights incident to that relation to him, and on
his death she became his widow, and as such succeeded to all
the rights in his property which the law gives a widow in the
property of her husband on his death. The only effect of such
divorce, where common law prevails, is to compel them to live
apart, and to deprive the husband of his control over his wife."
In conclusion it may be said that, generally, where a divorce
a vinculo matimonii has been granted, the wife loses all property rights in the estate of her husband; if the divorce is only
from bed and board the property rights are not affected. This
seems the most rational rule and the one calculated to avoid
useless litigation.
CRIINA.L LAW: RVURSAI, OF SENTENCE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY.-In the case of Commonwealth v. HurAy, 54 N. E. 86o,
(1899), the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts from a sentence passed on him by the Superior Court
of that State, claiming that he was by it placed a second time
in "jeopardy of life and limb." His contention was based on
the following state of facts: The crime of which he was convicted was made statutory by an Act subsequent in time to the
commission of the crime itself. He was indicted, found guilty
and sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
It was subsequently held that the statute under which he was
sentenced was unconstitutional so far as it related to past
offences. On an appeal brought by the prisoner his sentence
was reversed, and he was remanded to the Superior Court for
sentence according to the law as it was when the offence was
committed. He, meanwhile, served two and one-half years of
his original sentence, and this time, together with the period
of the second sentence, amounted a greater time than that of
his first sentence.
He appealed from the second sentence, contending that by it
he was placed twice in jeopardy, and deprived of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, however,
held that, since he was not to be placed on trial a second time,
he would not be put twice in jeopardy, and that, "though the
effect of the re-sentence will be to compel the defendant to suffer solitary confinement twice, and will result in his actual confinement for a longer period than the term for which he was
. that the last sen-

originally sentenced, we do not see . .

.

tence is rendered invalid thereby."
Blackstone says it is a "universal

maxim of the corn-
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mon law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy
of his life more than once for the same offence," (B1. Com. IV,
335), and this extends to all offences, capital or otherwise.
The principles of law reached in the various jurisdictions from
this maxim as a basis are very nearly in accord. When a person has been, in due form of law, tried upon a good and sufficient indictment, and convicted or acquitted, that, conviction or
acquittal may be pleaded in bar to a subsequent prosecution,
within the same jurisdiction, for the same offence: May.
Crim. Law, 117. And even if the indictment be insufficient
and the proceedings be irregular, so that a judgment thereon
might be set aside upon proper process, yet if the sentence
thereunder has been acquiesced in by and executed upon the
convict, such illegal and voidable judgment constitutes a good
plea in bar. Com. v. Loud, 3 Met. 328 (1841). But where the
prisoner himself seeks to have the sentence reversed, as where
he is convicted by a misdirection of the judge on point of law,
or by misconduct on the part of the jury, in such case if he has
the verdict set aside, he may again be sent to the bar. Reg. v.
Deane, 5 Cox, C. C. 501 (185); Com. v. Green, 17 Mass. 515
(1822).

So in the case in point, the prisoner himself sought to have
the original sentence reversed, and could therefore be lawfully
re-sentenced.
In New York the case of MAcKee v. The People, 32 N. Y. 245
(i865), held that a person is said to be put in jeopardy only
when he is tried a second time upon a criminal accusation, but
that the term has no relation to the reversal of the erroneous
judgment and pronouncing a legal one, pursuant to a legal
conviction. In England, Reg. v. Drury, 3 Car & K. 193
(1849), holds that a judgment and sentence reversed are the
same as if there had been no judgment and sentence, and this
must be so even if the prisoner has served part of the sentence.
See, also, Rex v. .Bourne,7 Adol. & R. 58 (1837); Rex. v. Ellis,
5 Barn. & C. 395 (1826).

The Pennsylvania courts, and the majority of the tribunals
in the United States, hold with Reg. v. Drury that it would be
shocking to both "justice and common sense that individuals,
who object only that they have been regularly found guilty of
an offence on a lawful trial, but that there has been a mistake
in the judgment pronounced, which judgment has on that
ground been reversed, a.nat ,an never be carried into effect,
"should therefore'remain exempt from all punishment."
"C."

Each of the Judges of the Orphans' Court of the County of
Philadelphia has a task like that of Sisyphus, who rolled the
stone to the top of the hill only to find that it always returned
to the bottom. Each first Monday of the month in term time
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finds the audit list, with its bulk of accounts, just as insistent
as was its like four weeks before. In addition to this "endless
chain" there are the demands of the motion and argument
lists. It is strange that one who is so occupied can find time
or take pleasure in legal study not immediately "fro re nata"
in the actual business of the Court. It is, however, to the
learning and kindness of a member of that bench, whose scholarship never grows weary, that the writer is indebted for some
instances of the use of the above abbreviation. Inapt and
unmeaning as it may seem, when the supposed precision of
legal expression is considered, it is woven into the text of a
great writer and into the most familiar forms of pleading.
Notably and deliciously quaint is this from Coke on Littleton:
"OF Flm SIMPLE."
17 b "'In such manuall occupation, &c.I
There is nothing
" in our author but is worthy of observation. Here is the
" first (&c.) and there is no (&c.) in all his three bookes (there
"being as you shall perceive very many), but it is for two pur"poses.
First, it doth imply some other necessary matter.
"Secondly, that the student may, together with that which
"our author has said, inquire what authorities there be in law
"that will treat of that matter, which will work three notable
"effects; first, it will make him understand our author the
"better: secondly, it will exceedingly adde to the reader's
"invention: and lastly, it will fasten the matter more surely in
"his memory; for which purpose I have for his ease in the
"beginning set downe, in these Institutes, the effect of some
"of the principal authorities in law, as I conceive them con"cerning the same."

Again:
140 b " ' Because of hisyounger age, may Least of all his breih"ern helpe himselfe, &c' Here by (&c.) are implyed those
causes wherefore a youth is lesse able to ayd himselfe, &c.
which the poet briefly and pithily expresseth thus:

2

"Imberbis juvenis, tandem custode remoto,
"Gaudet equis, canibusque, et aprici gramine campi,
"Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus asper,
"Utilium tardus provisor prodigus aeris,
"Sublimis, cupidusque, et amata relinquere pernix.
" And againe, no living creature more infirme than man:
" Nil homine infirmum tellus animalia nutrit
" Inter cuncta magis.-"
How many practitioners in drawing petitions have inquired
the meaning of the "&c." in the oft-written conclusion" And
your petitioner will ever pray, &c."? Doubtless every one has
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deemed it an invocation of blessing on the Court, but it is interesting to note some examples of the ancient phraseology. The
abbreviation, however, has been employed for many years-for
centuries indeed.
In "Cursus Cancellariae," or the Course of Proceedings in
the High Court of Chancery, London 1715, the modem form
is given v. p. 69, 330, 331, "And your petitioner shall ever

pray, &c."
In the preface to "Aeta Cancellariae," or Selections from
the Records of the Court of Chancery, London, 1847, the
author, Cecil Munro, one of the Registrars of the Court, states
that the papers contained in the volume "have been extracted,
with one exception, from documents remaining as of record in
the Report office of the Court of Chancery; where they have
lain probably untouched for considerably more than two centuries." A petition of Sir William Wogan, Knight, in Barlow
vs. Wogan (M. T. 1611) is given on p. 156, praying the Lord
Chancellor to grant the petitioner "ease of this, his punishment." It ends with the familiar "and he shall daily pray,
&c." and there are like instances of the use of this form.
There are, however, several cases of the extended form of this
prayer. Thus on p. 267 (1619) "And your petitioner as in duty
bound shall daily pray for your Lordship's long life." On
p. 294 (1620) "Shall ever pray for your Honor."
On p. 270
(1619)

.

.

" for which your petitioner will ever pray for

your Lordships endless happiness."
An amazing compilation is to be found in " Calendars in
Chancery of Queen Elizabeth," printed by order of the record
commissioners. . Prefixed to the calendar is a selection of bills
and petitions of.dates. anterior to Queen Elizabeth's reign. In
the appendix to that "excellent little book," "Haynes Outlines of Equity" (288) there is a bill, taken from the Calendars
in. Chancery, which shows in full what the subsequent "&c."
meant; i. e., in substance, for the prayers of benison at the end
of ancient petitions in equity varied in phrase. These words
appear, inter alia, " And she shall pray God for yaw "-Vol. I,
p. Xli (Reign of Hnfi." VI). On the same page " And yd'
said pore orators shall'e4 pay to God for yo good Lordship."
-"
said- supplr shall according to his bounden duty, daily pray
to Almighty -God for yr prservacon of yr h i' health long to continue." , I59 5-Id. CXliv (Reign of Elizabeth).
Illistrations might be multiplied, e. g., Thomas vs. Pierce,
I Chester Co. Rep.. 4o3,.which explains the expressions "when,
&c.," and "under'which, &c.," in the ordinary forms of
avowry and cognialidd- of rent in arrear in actions of replevin,
but the foregoing are'sufficient as a matter of interest.

. w.p.

